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Abstract: 
In this paper we challenge the view that corporate bonds are always arm’s length debt. We 
analyze the effect of bond ratings on the stock price return to acquirers in M&A transactions, 
which tend to have significant effects on creditor wealth. We find acquirers abnormal returns 
to be higher if they are unrated, controlling for a wide variety of other effects identified in the 
literature. Tracing the difference in returns to distinct managerial decisions, we find that, 
everything else constant, rated firms increase their leverage in takeover transactions by less 
than their unrated counterparts. Consistent with a significant role for rating agencies, we find 
monitoring effects to be strongest when acquirer bonds are rated at the borderline between 
investment grade and junk. Finally, we are able to empirically exclude a large number of 
alternative explanations for the empirical regularities that we uncover. 
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1. Introduction 
 
There is a long tradition in finance that distinguishes between relationship lending and arm’s 
length debt. Going back to Diamond (1991), the possibility to obtain customer specific and 
proprietary screening information defines relationship lending. Rajan (1992) adds a time 
dimension, encompassing the possibility to monitor the borrower over the duration of the 
relationship, and having some control over the owner’s continuation decision. If these 
screening and monitoring characteristics, i.e. private information and repeated interaction are 
absent, the financing relationship is called arm’s length.  
Corporate bonds issued in capital markets are seen as the proverbial arm’s length financing, 
for two reasons: first, bond investors have access to public but not to private information. 
Second, bond investors are widely dispersed, rendering monitoring, coordination and 
renegotiations costly, or even impossible (Rajan, 1992, Amihud et al., 1999). Indeed, Kahan 
and Rock (2009) argue that “In the past, many violations of bondholder rights have remained 
undetected and unsanctioned”.  
However, as we demonstrate in this paper, bond financing may be more similar to relationship 
lending than commonly believed, provided that the bond is rated by a rating agency. This 
argument is based on the extended economic role of ratings in capital markets proposed in 
Boot et al. (2006). Boot et al. (2006) argue that credit ratings provide a coordination device 
for bond investors and firms, when otherwise multiple equilibria would prevail. In their 
model, monitoring during, e.g. a watchlist period may influence the investment decision of the 
rated firm. This is because firm management is forced to optimize its investment and 
financing policy in the light of its impact on the cost of capital. Via the rating process, the 
expectations of bond investors and firm management can be coordinated.    3 
We identify the marginal effect of ratings on firm policy by comparing the distribution of 
returns in M&A transactions for rated and unrated bidders. M&A events are well suited for a 
test because mergers tend to have strong risk implications and strongly affect the interests of 
debt holders. From the recent empirical literature on corporate debt structures, as in Houston 
and James (1996), Denis and Mihov (2003) and Rauh and Sufi (2010), we know that rated 
and unrated firms do not differ much with respect to the use of bonds, bank and other types of 
debt. Hence, controlling for other determinants of acquirer’s abnormal return at the 
announcement of a merger, we feel we can identify the marginal effect supplied by the 
existence of a rating. As a second identification strategy we also employ firm fixed effects, 
i.e. we compare the abnormal returns of bidders in M&A transactions that change rating status 
during our sample period.  
We document  in a large sample of merger announcements spanning 1980 to 2004 that 
acquirer gains from a merger are significantly smaller if the acquirer is rated by a major rating 
agency than if the acquirer is unrated. The effect is economically important: We find a one 
percentage point difference in returns over a three day horizon between rated and unrated 
acquirers and we show that this effect does not reverse over time. This result is robust to 
controlling for standard determinants of acquirer gains from mergers used in the literature 
(e.g. Moeller et al., 2004). Further, we show that mergers initiated by rated acquirers result in 
a significantly smaller increase in leverage subsequent to the merger. Mergers initiated by 
rated firms tend to be less debt financed compared to mergers initiated by unrated firms. 
Taken together, the results are consistent with the hypothesis that rating agencies protect the 
interest of bondholders in mergers, in particular by constraining the increase in leverage 
following an acquisition. This can be viewed as monitoring of the borrower similar to the 
monitoring that may take place in a lending relationship.  This monitoring by rating agencies 
has real consequences for central decisions of the firm, such as its capital structure and   4 
whether or not to acquire another firm. The findings suggest that rated corporate bonds appear 
to be much less “arm’s length” than previously thought.  
Given that being rated is not exogenous, we control for endogeneity using similar instruments 
as in Faulkender and Petersen (2006) and  we explore a large number of potential alternative 
explanations for the negative relationship between having a rating and the abnormal return 
upon a merger announcement, including managerial hubris, overvaluation and more stringent 
monitoring of rated firms by the market. While we find support for several of these theories, 
ratings continue to be a first order determinant of acquirer gains from mergers. 
 
To our knowledge we are the first to study the effect of ratings on shareholder wealth in a 
merger. However, there is a growing literature that examines the effects of bondholder control 
rights on bondholder and shareholder wealth. For example Gao et al. (2009) show that even 
technical covenant violations, such as late filings of financial statements, result in stock price 
declines. Our findings are also in line with Manconi and Massa (2010) who show that 
bondholder concentration, used as a proxy for the ability of bondholders to actively assert 
their rights, results in more conservative firm policies. Cash retentions are higher, pay-outs 
lower and asset volatility and default probabilities decline significantly. Cremers et al. (2007) 
analyzes the effect of shareholder control rights and bondholder control rights on bond yields. 
They argue that strong shareholder governance increases bondholders’ concerns of takeover 
risk. The increase in credit risk associated with shareholder control and weak takeover 
defenses is strongest for firms that are small and are hence more likely to be takeover targets, 
which provides further support for this view. Cremers et al. (2007) then show that bondholder 
governance, by way of bond covenants, mitigates the potential conflict between shareholders 
and bondholders.  
   5 
Low et al. (2007) analyze the effect of shareholder power on target bondholder returns and 
ratings. They show that stronger shareholder power is associated with positive abnormal 
returns for bond holders. This supports the view that superior monitoring of managers, 
improves collateral values. They conclude that good corporate governance can be beneficial 
to bondholders as well. Our paper suggests that the reverse does not hold: stronger bondholder 
power does not benefit shareholders. Hence, the results in our paper are consistent with Klock 
et al. (2004) who find that strong anti-takeover provisions, implying weak shareholder control 
rights and strong management discretion, are associated with lower refinancing costs of debt. 
Their paper, like ours, points in the direction of conflicts between the strength of shareholder 
rights and the strength of bondholder rights. 
 
There is a wealth of related literature on bond market reactions to merger announcements. 
Billett et al (2004) analyze stock and bond market reactions to M&A announcements. They 
find that target bondholder earn excess returns (measured over a 2 month period) if the rating 
of the acquirer is higher compared to the rating of the target. They show that when takeovers 
are accompanied by an increase in asset risk or reduction in credit rating of the target firm, the 
bondholders of the target firm lose. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the data we use, 
the empirical approach and present some basic descriptive statistics documenting the 
difference in rated and unrated acquirer’s gains from mergers. In section 3, we examine 
whether these differences can be explained by differences in firm or deal characteristics. In 
section 4, we examine our central hypothesis in more depth and show that post merger 
leverage of deals involving rated acquirers is lower than post merger leverage of unrated 
acquirers. Section 5 presents evidence that the differences in acquirer gains between rated and   6 
unrated firms are persistent and have substantial welfare effects for shareholders. In section 6 
we explore alternative explanations for our findings. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Data and methodology 
 
2.1. Data 
 
The sample consists of merger announcements that resulted in a completed transaction. The 
data come from the Securities Data Company’s (SDC) U.S. Mergers and Acquisitions 
database. We select domestic mergers and acquisitions with announcement dates between 
1980 and 2004. We use the same selection criteria as in the previous literature (e.g. Moeller et 
al., 2004), except that we limit the sample to non-financial firms. Hence we exclude all 
observations involving acquirers in SIC codes 6000 to 6999. Adams and Mehran (2003) and 
Macey and O’Hara (2003) argue that there are many reasons to believe that the governance of 
banks and other financial institutions differs significantly from that of non-financial firms. We 
consider only acquisitions in which acquiring firms end up with all shares of the acquired firm 
or subsidiary, and we require the acquiring firm to control less than 50% of the shares of the 
target firm before the announcement. We further require that (1) the deal value is greater than 
$1 million, (2) a public or private U.S. firm or a non-public subsidiary of a public or private 
firm are acquired, and (3) the acquirer is a public firm listed on the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat during the event window. Deal value is defined by 
SDC as the total value of consideration paid by the acquirer, excluding fees and expenses. 
After collecting these acquisitions, we eliminate those in which the deal value relative to the 
market value of the acquirer is less than 1 percent. The market value of the acquirer is defined 
as the sum of the market value of equity, long-term debt, debt in current liabilities, and the 
liquidating value of preferred stock. We also require that the number of days between the 
announcement and completion dates is between zero and one thousand.    7 
 
Ultimately we end up with a sample of 11,547 observations. 25 percent of the announcements 
(2,746 observations) involve announcements for rated acquirers; the remainder constitutes 
merger announcements for unrated acquirers. Table 1 shows the number of acquisitions by 
year. Merger announcements increased since the 1980s, but the increase is non-monotonic. 
Mergers were particularly frequent in the late 1990s and dropped off in the early 90s and most 
recently.  
 
The table also shows acquisitions by rated versus unrated firms over time. We define a rated 
firm as a firm with an issuer rating from Moody’s. With the exception of 1985/1986, 
acquisitions by unrated firms outnumber those by rated firms by about three to one. In our 
empirical analysis, we will generally use year dummies to control for these patterns over time. 
 
 
2.2. The gains to acquiring firm shareholders 
 
We use the standard approach to evaluate the returns to acquiring shareholders and estimate 
abnormal percentage returns with standard event study methods (following Brown and 
Warner, 1985, MacKinlay, 1997). We estimate these abnormal returns over the three-day 
event window (-1, +1) using market model benchmark returns with the CRSP equally-
weighted index returns. The parameters for the market model are estimated over the (-205, -6) 
interval, and the p-values are estimated using the time-series and cross-sectional variation of 
abnormal returns. 
 
Table 2 presents the equally weighted abnormal returns for our sample of acquirers. Overall, 
consistent with the pervious literature (Andrade et al., 2001), acquirer gains from a merger 
tend to be small, but positive. Mean CAR is 1.8 percent with a median of 0.67 percent. Both   8 
are statistically significant at the 1 percent level (Column 1 of Table 2). In columns 2 and 3 
we report abnormal returns for rated and unrated firms separately.  Abnormal returns differ 
substantially across rating status. Rated acquires show a 3 day mean cumulative abnormal 
return of 0.57 percent. The median is even smaller at 0.31 percent. In stark contrast, unrated 
acquirers show a three day cumulative abnormal return of 2.23 percent, with a median of 0.84 
percent. The difference between rated and unrated cumulative abnormal returns is significant 
at the 1 percent level for means and medians.  
 
In Table 3 we break down the sample further into investment grade rated firms, non-
investment grade rated firms and unrated firms. We find that the gains from mergers are 
negative on average (and at the median) for investment grade firms. This is statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level (1 percent level for the median). Non-investment grade 
rated firms show a positive cumulative abnormal return of 1.27 percent and a median of 0.78 
percent. Again, both are significant at the 1 percent level. We are able to reject that 
investment grade abnormal returns are equal to non-investment grade abnormal returns or 
unrated firms’ abnormal returns for means and medians at the 1 percent level. We are also 
able to reject equality of means for investment grade versus non-investment grade abnormal 
returns for the mean and the median at the 1 percent level and for non-investment grade firms 
and unrated firms at the 1 percent level for the mean. The median abnormal returns between 
non-investment grade and not rated firms are not statistically different from one another. The 
results suggest that shareholders of firms without rating have higher acquisition gains than 
shareholders of non-investment grade firms. Shareholders of investment grade firms lose on 
average.  
 
Intrigued by these patterns, we report abnormal returns by individual rating notch in Table 4. 
Two striking observations stand out. One, as an acquirer has a higher rating, the gains from   9 
acquisition are smaller. The relationship is monotonous: As ratings worsen, abnormal returns 
upon merger announcement increase. Second, we find a strong negative abnormal return for 
acquirers rated Baa3, which is the lowest investment grade rating. Firms that are just 
investment grade appear to make the worst (from the perspective of their shareholders) 
acquisitions. We interpret this finding as evidence that the threat of the rating agency to 
downgrade a firm to below investment grade prevents firms from engaging in mergers that are 
profitable to acquirer shareholders. The monitoring of rating agencies is particularly effective 
at the lowest investment grade rating, as the threat to downgrade to below investment grade.
2
 
  
3. Is the rating effect explained by firm and deal characteristics? 
3.1. Descriptive evidence 
 
As a first step we show how firm and deal characteristics vary for rated versus unrated 
acquirers. Table 5 shows the firm and deal characteristics for rated and unrated acquirers, as 
well as the difference. The dollar value of transactions for rated acquires is more than five 
times that of unrated acquirers. This corresponds only in part to their relative size: In panel B 
we report that unrated acquirers are about one eighth in total book assets and about one sixth 
in market value. Relative to their size, merger targets are larger for unrated acquirers. All of 
these differences are significant at the 1 percent level. We find no significant difference in the 
probability that the deal was competed: Competed deals are rare both for unrated and rated 
acquirers. However, as Moeller et al. (2004) point out, the proxy we use, namely whether 
multiple firms make a public bid for the same target, is weak. The proxy does not reflect that 
some bidding may go on in private as in Boone and Mulherin (2002). Further, an initial bid of 
                                                 
2 Complementary evidence is provided by Bannier and Wiemann (2011), who show that interest rates on bank 
loans to highly rated (investment grade and above) firms are significantly more likely to be tied to a bond rating 
than interest on bank loans to poorly rated firms. This is consistent with Table 4 and can explain why rating 
agencies may be significantly more powerful in highly rated firms than in poorly rated firms. It also further 
supports Boot et al. (2006) who argue that rating agencies may provide a focal point for the coordination 
between debt holders and the financial and investment decisions of firm management.  
   10 
one firm may reflect potential competition, precisely to deter competing bidders from bidding 
for a target in the first place. Hence, based on Schlingemann et al. (2002) we use the value of 
all corporate control deals in a particular year and two-digit SIC code divided by the book 
value of all assets in the corresponding year and the SIC code, liquidity index. We find this 
index to be significantly (at the 5 percent level) higher for unrated firms compared to rated 
firms.  
 
The literature suggests that offers for public firms have lower abnormal returns compared to 
offers for private firms (Chang, 1998; Fuller et al., 2002). For example, Fuller et al (2002) 
argue that the market for private firms is not as liquid as the market for public targets. 
Therefore private firms are sold at a discount. Second, Chang (1998) argues that stock offers 
for privately held firms create a large shareholder that is better able to monitor the 
management. This would result in larger abnormal returns for shareholders of acquiring firms 
when acquiring a private target. We find that rated acquirers are significantly more likely to 
acquire public targets and hence it is important to control for the organizational form of the 
target in the regressions below. 
 
We find that unrated acquirers use less cash and more equity compared to rated acquirers 
(statistically significant at the 1 percent level). This difference is consistent with the idea that 
due to larger asymmetric information it is more difficult for unrated acquirers to raise fresh 
funds through issuing bonds in the market (Frank and Goyal, 2010). We further find that only 
1.1 percent of all deals involving rated acquirers and 0.3 percent of unrated acquirers are 
hostile take-over bids. Schwert (2000) shows that hostile deals are associated with lower 
abnormal returns for bidders and, hence, it is possible that at least part of the difference in 
bidder abnormal returns between rated and unrated acquirers are due to the propensity to 
make hostile bids. We will therefore control for hostile deals in the regressions below.   11 
Unrated firms are much less likely to make tender offers compared to rated firms. Unrated 
and rated firms are equally likely to be involved in diversifying acquisitions (“conglomerate 
deals”). Following the literature, we classify a merger as a conglomerate deal when the 
acquirer and the target have different two-digit SIC codes. 
 
In panel B, we show additional firm characteristics of rated and unrated acquirers. Aside from 
the large size difference, we find that unrated acquirers tend to be significantly (at the 1 
percent level) less leveraged compared to rated acquirers. This is further evidence that it is 
much more difficult for unrated firms to raise debt (Frank and Goyal, 2010), but also 
inconsistent with previous evidence that suggests that smaller firms are more levered 
(Maloney et al., 1993). Consistent with Almeida et al. (2004) we find that rated acquirer have 
lower cash holdings compared to unrated acquirers. At the same time, unrated firms tend to 
have higher Tobin’s q. This could help explain the ratings effect as high q firms tend to make 
better acquisitions (Lang et al., 1989 and Servaes, 1991).   
 
3.2. Regressions controlling for firm and deal characteristics 
 
We show in Table 2 that abnormal returns for rated acquirers are significantly lower than 
those for unrated acquirers. This is true both for mean and for median abnormal returns and 
the differences are significant at the 1 percent level. However, in Table 5 we also show that 
both deal and acquirer characteristics are also significantly different. In particular, rated firms 
are larger and acquire relatively smaller targets. Deals for rated firms tend to take longer to 
completion and involve more cash acquisitions of public targets. Furthermore, ex ante, rated 
firms tend to be more leveraged with lower q. Hence, it seems important to examine the 
robustness of the ratings effect controlling for acquirer and deal characteristics. The results of 
this exercise are presented in Table 6.  
   12 
We find that controlling for deal and firm characteristics, abnormal returns for rated acquirers 
are 1 percentage point lower than for unrated firms. This suggests that 0.7 percentage points 
or 25% of the univariate difference between rated and unrated acquirer abnormal returns are 
explained by firm and deal characteristics. Nevertheless, the difference between rated and 
unrated acquirer abnormal returns remains significant at the 1 percent level. 
 
The control variables tend to confirm to expectations and are similar to those in the literature 
(Moeller et al., 2004, Chen et al., 2007, Wang and Xie, 2009) with a few exceptions. In 
contrast to Moeller et al. (2004) and Chen et al. (2007) but consistent with Maloney et al. 
(1993) we find that acquirer with higher leverage have higher abnormal returns. As Moeller et 
al (2004) we find that Tobin`s q is negative and significant, although the effect is 
economically small. This finding is in contrast to Lang et al. (1989) and Servaes (1991) who 
report a positive relation between acquirer abnormal returns and Tobin`s q. For acquisitions 
financed only with cash the coefficient turns out to be negative but not significant. This does 
not come as a surprise given the inconclusive findings in the previous literature. We confirm 
Moeller et al.’s (2004) finding that size is an important determinant of acquirer abnormal 
returns. As in their paper, the abnormal returns of smaller firms are significantly higher.
3
 
 
Finally our coefficients on relative size and liquidity index tend to be in the right direction but 
not significant. 
Thus far we ignored the panel structure of our sample. By including firm fixed effects we can 
control for unobservable firm specific heterogeneity and identify the effect of independent 
variables from the within firm variation only. In particular, the rating effect is identified only 
by the time series variation of firms that were involved in more than one merger and whose 
                                                 
3 We follow Moeller et al. (2004) in our baseline and all following specifications include a dummy for small 
firms. The small dummy is equal to 1 if the acquirer has a market capitalization equal to or less than the market 
capitalization of the 25th percentile of NYSE firms in the same year. We also estimated models with a 
continuous size variable. The results are available from the authors upon request.   13 
rating status changed. During the sample period 416 out of 4563 firms (9.13 percent) 
experience a rating status change and are involved in more than one merger. The firm fixed 
effects specification is presented as Model 2 in Table 6 (column 3 of Table 6). The results are 
qualitatively similar to the results of Model 1. The rating dummy remains negative and 
statistically significant (at the 10 percent level): the abnormal returns associated with merger 
announcements of an unrated acquirer are significantly higher than the abnormal returns 
associated with merger announcements of that same acquirer with a rating.  
 
The fixed effects specification presented above is only able to control for firm heterogeneity 
that remains constant over time. Hence, it does not address the problem that to obtain a rating 
is a decision of the firm. We now turn to address this potential endogeneity. In order to do this 
we apply an instrumental variable approach. We use instruments for acquiring a rating that 
have been recently proposed in the literature by Faulkender and Petersen (2006). Faulkender 
and Petersen (2006) use instruments that are likely to be related to how well known to the 
market the firm or the industry is, in which the firm operates. The instruments are (i) whether 
the shares of the firm trade at the NYSE. (ii) whether the firm is a member of the S&P 500, 
(iii) log of one plus the percentage of firms in the same three-digit industry that have a bond 
rating, excluding the firm of interest, (iv) log of one plus the percentage of firms in the same 
three-digit industry that have a bond rating weighted by the market value of assets, excluding 
the firm of interest, (v) whether the firm is younger than three years.
4
                                                 
4 Faulkender and  Petersen (2006) also use a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is too small to issue enough 
public debt to be included in the Lehman Corporate Bond  index as an additional instrument. Since we do not 
have access to this variable we do not include it in our analysis. 
 Appendix Table A1 
presents results for the first stage regression of all the instruments on the rating status of the 
firm. As can be seen four out of five instruments are statistically different from zero. The 
signs are as expected except for value weighted industry variable which turns out to be 
negative. As in Faulkender and Petersen (2006) firm age turns out not to be significant. The   14 
adjusted R
2 of the first stage regression 35.9 percent and the F-value is 170.75. Taking 
together these results indicate that our instruments seem to be valid.  
 
Results of the second stage of the instrument variable regression are presented in column 4 of 
Table 6. We report the results when we use all five instruments discussed above but our 
results are not affected by using all statistically significant instruments or by using only S&P 
500 membership as an instrument. While the other coefficients are largely similar to the ones 
in the OLS regression the economic importance of the rating dummy variable becomes larger 
(from -0.0097 to -0.0315) and the coefficient remains statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level. 
 
Finally, we show in the univariate analysis that abnormal returns tend to decline with the 
rating of the firm. The higher the rating, the lower the acquirer gains from a merger. In 
column 5, we check whether this finding carries over if we control for the standard 
determinants of acquirer abnormal returns. We find that this is indeed the case  
 
Overall our univariate as well as multivariate findings establish that the cumulative abnormal 
return at announcement is lower for rated firms. We investigate the potential explanations for 
this finding in the following several sections.  
 
4. Bondholder control rights and ratings 
 
One explanation for the difference in announcement abnormal returns for rated and unrated 
acquirers is that the rating agency monitors the firm on behalf of bondholder. The rating 
agency strengthens the relative position of bondholders relative to shareholders and being 
rated prevents shareholders from extracting rents from bondholders in a merger. According to 
this explanation, rated bonds seem to be much less “arm’s length” than previously thought. If   15 
true, we would expect to see that rated firms enter into fewer deals that increase the risk of the 
resulting merged firm. One natural way to think about an increase in risk of a firm in this 
context is to finance the acquisition with debt and increase post merger leverage. Hence, we 
examine the change in (market) leverage of acquirers. We follow Martin (1996) and define 
leverage as total debt over the sum of total debt, liquidation value of preferred stocks and the 
market value of common stock. The change in leverage is measured as leverage at the fiscal 
year end following the completion of the deal minus the leverage a at the fiscal year end prior 
to the announcement date.  
 
Table 7 column 1 reports results for the cross-sectional regression of the absolute change in 
leverage on controls for deal type plus the rating dummy. Note that we lose a few 
observations because balance sheet data is unavailable for some firms. Results are consistent 
with a monitoring role of rating agencies, reducing the “arm’s length” character of bonds. 
Rated firms have less leverage in the year following the transaction than firms without rating.
5
 
  
Note, however, that leverage is measured as in absolute differences in the specification in 
column 1. This raises the possibility that our finding is simply a mechanical effect: We know 
from Table 5 that rated firms have more leverage ex ante (before the merger) compared to 
unrated firms. If they merge with a firm with less leverage the leverage of the combined firm 
will decline. Hence, it may be important to control for initial leverage. Table 7 column 2 
presents these results. Note that this reduces our sample further because we have to exclude 
firms with zero initial leverage. The results confirm the finding that mergers initiated by rated 
firms result in a smaller change in leverage compared to mergers initiated by unrated firms. 
This is an important result, as it suggests that rating agencies protect the interests of bond 
                                                 
5 This result is even more striking if one considers that there is strong evidence that rated firms have better 
access to bond markets (Faulkender and Petersen, 2006) and hence, prima facie, one would expect those firms to 
be more likely to use debt to finance acquisitions. Our results suggest the opposite. It appears that the monitoring 
effect of rating agencies outweighs the access effect of the rating, at least at the margin considered in this paper.    16 
holders by influencing firm decisions. We interpret this as a monitoring role of rating 
agencies: Rated bonds tend to be less “arm’s length” compared to unrated debt.  
 
5. Persistence and welfare effects 
 
So far we have assumed that markets are efficient at incorporating information. If markets are 
efficient, the abnormal return upon merger announcement is an unbiased estimate of the value 
of the transaction to the shareholders of the acquirer. However, if markets are not efficient, 
the higher abnormal returns upon announcement may be offset by lower subsequent returns 
and vice versa. To investigate this question we compare the long-term performance of rated 
and unrated acquirers. We use the calendar-time portfolio approach advocated by Fama 
(1998). Each month we form an equally-weighted portfolio of observations that have 
completed a transaction in the past time period. We let this time period vary between 6 and 36 
months. The portfolio is rebalanced every month to drop the firms that have reached the end 
of their holding period and add all firms that have just completed a transaction. Repeated 
values are dropped for each observation. Also months with less than 10 observations are 
dropped. Table 8 reports results for the full sample, as well as for the rated and unrated 
subsamples. We do not find any significant coefficients and are unable to detect any 
difference between rated and unrated acquirers long-run performance for any of the 
investment horizons. The results do not support the idea that the higher announcement 
abnormal returns of unrated acquirers are explained by inefficient markets.  
 
One interpretation of the findings presented so far in this paper is that rating agencies are able 
to prevent mergers that are detrimental to bondholders. This raises the question whether rated 
firms engage in mergers whose combined value is higher or lower than that of unrated firms. 
Hence, in this section we check whether the synergy gains of mergers with rated acquirers are 
higher or lower compared to the synergy gains of mergers with unrated acquirers. To calculate   17 
the synergy gains we follow the literature and apply the method of Bradley et al. (1988). 
Based on Bradley et al. (1988) the total percentage synergy gains, CARC, are calculated as 
follows. First, we form an event time value-weighted portfolio of the return of the target and 
acquirer for each transaction, where the weights are given by the market value of equity two 
days before the announcement of the deal. Second, market model residuals are calculated for 
each transaction in the time period (-1, +1), where the estimation window spans the time 
period from (-205, +6). The CARC is calculated as the sum of the market model residuals in 
the event window (-1, +1). The change in the capitalization of the acquiring and acquired 
firms over the event window, $CARC, is calculated as the sum of the market value of equity 
for the target and the acquirer times the CARC for the respective transaction. CARC is in 
percent, $CARC is in millions of dollar.  
 
The results are reported in Table 9. Since we require target firms to have stock price 
information in order to calculate CARC, the sample is reduced to 1729 observations. For this 
sample, the average abnormal return is 2.13 percent, which is significant at the 1 percent 
level. However, the dollar abnormal return is a loss of $41.75 million, also statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level. Both the cumulative abnormal return and the dollar value 
synergy gain are very close to the results obtained in Moeller et al. (2004) in a similar sample.  
 
Turning to rated versus unrated acquirers, mergers in which a rated firm was the acquirer 
show positive CARC at 1.98 percent (significant at the 1 percent level). With an unrated 
acquirer, synergies seem to be larger at 2.24 percent cumulative abnormal return, although the 
difference is not significant. Even unrated firms’ synergy value is negative, however, but 
there is a $22 million difference between rated and not-rated firms. Again, the difference is 
not significant. Overall, the results weakly suggest that rating agencies prevent profitable 
mergers from taking place. In this sense, the presence of rating agencies shifts value from   18 
shareholders to bondholders and other debtholders of firms. This is interesting in light of the 
findings in Wang and Xie (2009). They analyze the effect of acquirer and target shareholder 
control rights on the synergy gains created by the acquisition. They find that the difference in 
the strength of shareholder rights between the acquirer and the target has a positive effect on 
acquisition synergy. They interpret their result to imply that acquisitions of firms with poor 
corporate governance by firms with good corporate governance generate more value. We find 
that stronger bondholder control rights have (weakly) the opposite effect, raising the 
possibility that part of the value in Wang and Xie (2009) comes at the expense of existing 
bondholders of the acquiring firm. 
 
6. Other potential explanations 
 
In this section we explore alternative explanations for the observed differences in merger 
announcement effects between rated and unrated acquirers that are unrelated to conflicts of 
interest between bondholders and shareholders and the role of rating agencies as monitors of 
the firm. First, we explore whether overvaluation (as measured by Tobin’s q) or information 
leakage can explain the lower abnormal returns of rated acquirers compared to unrated 
acquirers. Second, we examine whether rated firms, and especially highly rated firms are 
more prone to overpay on acquisitions compared to lower rated or unrated firms, possibly due 
to managerial hubris. Third, we examine whether rated firms are simply more closely watched 
by markets and therefore information about potential mergers is leaked to the market before 
the formal announcement. If this were the case, part of the gain to acquiring shareholders 
would occur in the days before the merger announcement and not at the time of the 
announcement itself. 
 
We report in Table 5 that unrated firms have significantly (at the 1 percent level) higher 
Tobin’s q compared to unrated firms. Lang et al. (1989) and Servaes (1991) show that   19 
acquirer abnormal returns in tender offers are significantly higher for high Tobin's q acquirers 
than for low Tobin’s q acquirers. This is especially so, if the q of the target is low. Lange et al. 
(1989) argue that this is consistent with the view that takeovers of poorly managed targets by 
well-managed bidders result in higher gains to existing acquirer shareholders. While we 
control for Tobin’s q in our baseline regressions (Table 6) and obtain a negative coefficient 
(significant at the 10 percent level), it is still possible that the significant coefficient for the 
ratings dummy is spurious. In order to check this question, we estimated the model separately 
for high q and for low q firms. The idea is that if we continue to obtain a negative coefficient 
for the ratings dummy for low and for high q firms, we can exclude that the differences in 
acquirer abnormal returns between rated and unrated bidders are solely due to the acquirer 
rent at low q firms (value firms).  
 
Table 10 reports the results of a partitioning of the sample by acquirer Tobin’s q. Column (1) 
re-runs the baseline model from Table 6 for growth firms, defined as the one-third of all firms 
having the highest Tobin’s q, the ‘growth’ firms. Column (2) runs the same regression for the 
one-third of our sample with the lowest q, the ‘value’ firms. The coefficient on Tobin’s q in 
the first regression is zero, while it is negative and significant at the 5% level for value firms, 
consistent with the results reported in Lang et al. (1989) and Servaes (1991). In both 
regressions, however, the rating variable continues to enter with a negative and significant 
coefficient. Thus, the influence of the rating status on acquirer announcement return is not 
confined to low-q (value) firms. We actually find the impact of the rated variable to be both 
larger in absolute terms, and statistically more significant in the growth regression. This is 
also consistent with the hypothesis that growth firms with fewer tangible assets are more 
likely to affect debtholder wealth negatively in merger transactions.  
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A second possible explanation for the differences in acquirer abnormal returns upon merger 
announcement between rated and unrated firms is information leakage. Rated firms may be 
watched much more closely by the market (Ederington and Goh, 1998) and therefore 
information about the merger may arrive in the market before the formal announcement date. 
If this is the case, the gains from a merger may be reflected in stock prices ahead of the 
announcement date, for rated firms, but not for unrated firms.  
 
To test this hypothesis, we look at one month of daily share price returns immediately prior to 
the event window, i.e. the trading days -25 to -3 in our baseline specification. Table 11 reports 
the mean and the median of the average CAR, where the latter is calculated as the realized 
stock return minus the return of the equally-weighted market portfolio from CRSP. We find 
an overall positive CAR which is significantly different from zero. If we distinguish between 
rated and unrated subsample, the value for the unrated sample is higher in absolute terms 
(1.07 against 0.36), and attains a higher significance level (1% against 10%), while the 
median values are similar in magnitude; only the unrated subsample has a significant 
coefficient, however. The results show that information leakage does not seem to be an 
explanation for our earlier results.  
  
Malmendier and Tate (2008) show that overconfident managers engage in more acquisitions 
and that average abnormal returns for these acquisitions are lower. It is possible that the 
managers of rated firms and in particular of highly rated firms are more likely to be 
overconfident. We do not have access to Malmendier and Tate’s (2008) proxy for 
overconfidence, but we can rely on their finding that overconfident managers more frequently 
tend to engage in unprofitable mergers. In order to address this alternative explanation we test 
whether rated firms tend to overpay by estimating the probability of a successful bid using the 
full sample. This sample contains both completed and uncompleted acquisition attempts. The   21 
results of the probit specification suggest that bids by rated firms tend to be more successful 
than those by unrated firms, consistent with Malmendier and Tate (2008). Model (1) in Table 
12 attempts to test the follow-up hypothesis that a larger success probability is associated with 
excessive bids. To this end we define the value premium of each bid, defined as the 
transaction value minus target market value 50 days prior of the bid, divided by target market 
value 50 days prior of the bid. This value premium should be higher for rated firms if there 
was over-confidence, i.e. over-biding by successful firms. As column (1) in Table 12 shows, 
the coefficient for rated firms is negative and insignificant. Hence, while we do find that rated 
acquirer’s have a higher probability of a successful bid, which is consistent with 
overconfidence, we find no evidence that this higher probability is due to overpaying. Overall, 
we find mixed evidence for Malmendier and Tate’s explanation.  
 
7. Conclusion  
 
In this paper we find evidence that rating agencies protect the interest of bondholders in 
mergers. The evidence is consistent with notion that rating agencies monitor the decisions of 
firms. Hence, rated bonds tend to be less arm’s length and more similar to relationship debt 
than previously thought. Relying on the result in Houston and James (1996), Denis and Mihov 
(2003), and Rauh and Sufi (2010) that the structure of liabilities of unrated and rated firms is 
largely similar, we identify the marginal contribution of a rating agency to monitoring of the 
firm. In a large sample of US merger announcements between 1980 and 2004, we find that the 
average cumulative abnormal return of acquirers over the event window is smaller for rated 
than for unrated firms. Furthermore, among all rated acquirers, if ratings are investment grade, 
the average cumulative abnormal return is smaller than for below-investment grade rated 
firms. Bondholder interest, therefore, appears to best protected if acquirers are highly rated 
public firms, where even small changes in bond default risk may be reflected in a rating   22 
downgrade. Recall that for high rating classes, the change in default risk required for a one 
notch downgrade is considerably smaller than for lower rated companies. Put differently, in 
the investment grade category, the disciplining ability of rating agencies is relatively high-
powered.  
 
In fact, the average cumulative abnormal return for the highest rating notches in our sample 
are all negative, in line with the early literature on the market for corporate control (see Jensen 
and Ruback 1983 for a survey). We test different models for explaining the variation in 
CARs, using the usual cross-sectional regression as well as a panel specification and an 
instrumental variable approach. In all regressions, we control for the type of the target form 
(private or public), its size (whether small or not), details of the transaction structure, and 
whether a cash or a pure equity deal, along with variables describing financial variables of the 
acquiring firm. In all specifications, the rated dummy exhibits a significantly negative 
coefficient. The gains from mergers are lower for rated firms.  
 
What is the reason for the negative impact of the rating status on share price performance? 
We hypothesize and test that the influence of the rating process on decision making of the 
acquirer effectively contains bond default risk. In Table 7 we show that over the first year 
after an acquisition, rated firms exhibit lower leverage, relative to unrated firms of otherwise 
similar characteristics. Furthermore, if the gains from a merger for the acquirer and the target 
are added up, we find a lower change in combined market capitalization, if the firms are rated. 
In contrast, unrated firms’ shareholders perform better than their rated peers. This, too, is an 
indication of a wealth transfer from bondholders to shareholders that is diminished if 
acquirers are under the scrutiny of a rating agency.  
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We explore a number of alternative explanations for the differences in acquirer gains of rated 
and unrated firms, including overvaluation, information leakage and managerial hubris. We 
can outright reject the first two alternatives and the evidence in favor of managerial hubris as 
an explanation of our results is mixed.  
 
Taken together, our evidence is consistent with the idea that bondholder wealth is protected 
by the presence of rating agencies. Rating agencies seem to monitor firms, which implies that 
rated bonds are less “arm’s length” compared to unrated debt. It appears that the threat of a 
downgrade is sufficient to affect the decisions of firms towards lower default risk.    24 
Table 1 Sample distribution sorted by announcement year and acquirer rating status 
 
The sample comprises of all domestic U.S. mergers and acquisitions between 1980 and 2004 listed on SDC where the 
publicly traded acquiring firm ends up with all the shares of a public, private, or subsidiary target. Further selection criteria 
are that the transaction is completed, the transaction value is greater than $1 million and at least 1% of acquirer`s market 
value, and that the transaction is completed in less than 1000 days. Acquirer that have a Moody`s estimated senior unsecured 
rating outstanding at the announcement date of the transaction are classified as rated. 
 
Announcement year    Acquirer rating status   
    Rated  Non rated  All 
1980    8  14  22 
1981    27  49  76 
1982    23  48  71 
1983    28  115  143 
1984    43  127  170 
1985    77  90  167 
1986    119  120  239 
1987    75  140  215 
1988    102  147  249 
1989    68  198  266 
1990    58  192  250 
1991    58  225  283 
1992    60  327  387 
1993    104  441  545 
1994    131  525  656 
1995    137  630  767 
1996    223  711  934 
1997    236  950  1,186 
1998    262  886  1,148 
1999    196  692  888 
2000    173  553  726 
2001    134  402  536 
2002    132  403  535 
2003    119  395  514 
2004    153  421  574 
         
All    2,746  8,801  11,547 
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Table 2 Announcement abnormal returns sorted by acquirer rating status 
The sample comprises of all domestic U.S. mergers and acquisitions between 1980 and 2004 listed on SDC where the 
publicly traded acquiring firm ends up with all the shares of a public, private, or subsidiary target. Further selection criteria 
are that the transaction is completed, the transaction value is greater than $1 million and at least 1% of acquirer`s market 
value, and that the transaction is completed in less than 1000 days. Acquirer that have a Moody`s estimated senior unsecured 
rating outstanding at the announcement date of the transaction are classified as rated. CAR denotes the cumulative abnormal 
return over a three-day event window (-1, +1) around the announcement date. It is the calculated as the realized stock return 
minus the return of the market portfolio, where the market portfolio is given by the equal-weighted portfolio from CRSP. The 
first (second) row reports the mean (median). The final row lists the number of observations for each sub-group. Mean and 
median values are tested using two-sided t-tests and Wilcoxon T tests, respectively. The difference tests are based on t-test 
for equality in means and Wilcoxon sign-rank test for equality of medians.  
 
  All  Rated  Not rated  Difference 
CAR  (1)  (2)  (3)  (3)-(2) 
  1.837
a  0.570
a  2.233
a  1.663
a 
  [0.672]
a  [0.306]
a  [0.844]
a  [0.538]
a 
  n=11547  n=2746  n=8801   
a statistical significance at the 1% level. 
b statistical significance at the 5% level. 
c statistical significance at the 10% level. 
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Table 3 Announcement abnormal returns sorted by acquirer rating status and rating category 
The sample comprises of all domestic U.S. mergers and acquisitions between 1980 and 2004 listed on SDC where the publicly traded acquiring firm ends up with all the shares of a public, private, 
or subsidiary target. Further selection criteria are that the transaction is completed, the transaction value is greater than $1 million and at least 1% of acquirer`s market value, and that the transaction 
is completed in less than 1000 days. Acquirer that have a Moody`s estimated senior unsecured rating outstanding at the announcement date of the transaction are classified as rated. Investment (non-
investment) grade ratings are above or equal to (below) Baa3. The first (second) row reports the mean (median) CAR classified by acquirer rating status and rating category. The final row lists the 
number of observations for each sub-group. CAR denotes the cumulative abnormal return over a three-day event window (-1, +1) around the announcement date. It is the calculated as the realized 
stock return minus the return of the market portfolio, where the market portfolio is given by the equal-weighted portfolio from CRSP. Mean and median values are tested using two-sided t-tests and 
Wilcoxon T tests, respectively. The difference tests are based on t-test for equality in means and Wilcoxon sign-rank test for equality of medians.  
 
 
All  Rated   Not rated  Difference tests 
  Investment grade  Non-investment grade     
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (3)-(2)  (4)-(2)  (4)-(3)  
1.837
a  -0.284
c  1.267
a  2.233
a  1.551
a  2.517
a  0.966
a 
[0.672]
a  [-0.143]
a  [0.783]
a  [0.844]
a  [0.926]
a  [0.987]
a  [0.061] 
n=11547  n=1234  n=1512  n=8801       
a statistical significance at the 1% level. 
b statistical significance at the 5% level. 
c statistical significance at the 10% level. 
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Table 4 Announcement cumulative return sorted by rating notch 
The sample comprises of all domestic U.S. mergers and acquisitions between 1980 and 2004 listed on SDC where the 
publicly traded acquiring firm ends up with all the shares of a public, private, or subsidiary target. Further selection criteria 
are that the transaction is completed, the transaction value is greater than $1 million and at least 1% of acquirer`s market 
value, and that the transaction is completed in less than 1000 days. Acquirer that have a Moody`s estimated senior unsecured 
rating outstanding at the announcement date of the transaction are classified as rated. CAR denotes the cumulative abnormal 
return over a three-day event window (-1, +1) around the announcement date. It is the calculated as the realized stock return 
minus the return of the market portfolio, where the market portfolio is given by the equal-weighted portfolio from CRSP. The 
first row lists the rating notch according to Moody`s, the final row lists the number of observations for each rating notch. 
 
  CAR 
 
 
Rating notch  Mean  Median  N 
Aaa  -1.202  -0.707  44 
Aa1  -1.101  -0.693  15 
Aa2  -0.374  -0.356  55 
Aa3  -0.694  -0.609  46 
A1  -0.055  -0.263  122 
A2  0.090  0.081  265 
A3  -1.184  -0.750  187 
Baa1  0.275  0.439  164 
Baa2  0.690  0.512  166 
Baa3  -1.083  -0.566  170 
Ba1  0.110  0.299  213 
Ba2  0.867  0.441  198 
Ba3  1.397  0.743  405 
B1  1.379  0.719  388 
B2  1.800  1.872  152 
B3  2.635  1.165  111 
Caa1  -1.444  0.263  21 
Caa2  3.824  2.656  18 
Caa3  2.642  0.491  6 
Ca  -  -  - 
C  -  -  - 
       
All  0.570  0.306  2746 
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Table 5 Summary statistics of firm characteristics sorted by acquirer rating status 
The sample comprises of all domestic U.S. mergers and acquisitions between 1980 and 2004 listed on SDC where the 
publicly traded acquiring firm ends up with all the shares of a public, private, or subsidiary target. Further selection criteria 
are that the transaction is completed, the transaction value is greater than $1 million and at least 1% of acquirer`s market 
value, and that the transaction is completed in less than 1000 days. Acquirer that have a Moody`s estimated senior unsecured 
rating outstanding at the announcement date of the transaction are classified as rated. The variables are defined as follows. 
Transaction value is value of transaction ($mil) as reported by SDC. Assets (book) is total assets (Compustat Item #6); Equity 
value (market) is number of common shares outstanding times price (Item #25 *Item 199); Conglomerate is a dummy 
variable equal to one for acquisitions of firms in another two-digit SIC code than the acquirer; Competed deals is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the deal is classified as competed by SDC; Days to completion is the difference between effective and 
announcement date; Liquidity index is calculated as the value of all transactions for $1 million or more reported by SDC for 
each year and two-digit SIC code divided by the total book value of assets of all Compustat firms in the same two-digit SIC 
code and year; Cash (Equity) in Payment is a dummy variable equal to one if part of consideration offered is cash (common 
stock); Pure cash (equity) deals is a dummy variable equal to one if the consideration offered consists only of cash (common 
stock); Hostile deals is a dummy variable equal to one if the attitude of the deal is classified as hostile by SDC; Tender offer 
is a dummy variable equal to one if the acquisition is a tender offer; Public target, private target, or subsidiary target is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the target is a public firm, a private firm, or subsidiary; Assets (market) is total assets minus 
book value of equity plus market value of equity (Item #6- Item 60+ Item #25+Item #199); Debt  is the sum of short-term and 
long-term debt (Item #9 + Item #34); Tobin`s Q is assets (market) divided by assets (book) ((Item #6- Item 60+ Item 
#25+Item #199)/Item #6); OCF is sales less cost of goods sold, selling, general, and administrative costs and changes in 
working capital (Item #12 –Item #41 –Item #189 –Item #180), finally Cash is Cash and short-term investments (Item #1). 
Values are expressed in mean [median]. The third column contains the difference in the means and medians as well as the 
statistical significance of the difference in means. The difference test is based on t-test for equality in means. 
  Rated 
 
 
Non rated 
(2) 
Difference 
()()     (1)  (2)  (2)-(1) 
Panel A: Deal characteristics       
Transaction value  748.59  138.29  -610.30
a 
  [122]  [19.98]   
       
Transaction value /assets (book)  .2512  .5731  .3219
a 
  [.0944]  [.1823]   
       
Transaction value / equity value (market)  .3616  .4769  .1153
b 
  [.1088]  [.1322]   
       
Competed deals  .0002  0  -.0002 
       
Days to completion  85.95  60.84  -25.11
a 
  [62]  [37]   
         
Liquidity index  .0234  .0252  .0018
b 
  .0117  .0123   
       
Cash in payment (%)  77.79  69.38  -8.41
a 
       
Equity in payment (%)  35.90  49.71  13.81
a 
       
Pure cash deals (%)  46.90  32.46  -14.44
a 
       
Pure equity deals (%)  13.83  21.86  8.03
a 
       
Hostile deals (%)  1.14  0.31  -0.83
a 
       
Tender offer (%)  10.26  3.15  -7.11
a 
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Conglomerate deals (%)  40.71  41.52  0.81 
       
Public target (%)  29.09  14.62  -14.47
a 
       
Private target (%)  29.89  55.78  25.89
a 
       
Subsidiary target (%)  41.00  29.58  -11.42
a 
       
Panel B: Acquirer characteristics       
Assets (book)  3467.77  456.40  -2219.24
a 
  [1248.53]  [107.58]   
       
Assets (market)  6707.89  1073.69  4823.24
a 
  [1884.65]  [214.83]   
       
Equity value (market)  4488.83  843.55  -3645.28
a 
  [1037.04]  [152.91]   
       
Debt/assets (market) 
 
.43  .26  -.17
a 
  [.41]  [.21]   
       
Tobin`s Q  1.77  2.63  .86
a 
    [1.48]  [1.78]   
       
OCF/ assets (market)  .08  .04  -.04
a 
    [.08]  [.06]   
       
Cash/ assets (book)  .09  .20  .11
a 
    [.04]  [.12]   
a statistical significance at the 1% level. 
b statistical significance at the 5% level. 
c statistical significance at the 10% level. 
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Table 6 Cross-sectional regression analysis of announcement abnormal returns 
The sample comprises of all domestic U.S. mergers and acquisitions between 1980 and 2004 listed on SDC where the 
publicly traded acquiring firm ends up with all the shares of a public, private, or subsidiary target. Further selection criteria 
are that the transaction is completed, the transaction value is greater than $1 million and at least 1% of acquirer`s market 
value, and that the transaction is completed in less than 1000 days. The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return 
of the acquirer over a 3 day period surrounding the announcement date. The explanatory variables are defined as follows. 
Transaction value is value of transaction ($mil) as reported by SDC, the small dummy is equal to 1 if the acquirer has a 
market capitalization equal to or less than the market capitalization of the 25th percentile of NYSE firms in the 
same year,; Conglomerate is a dummy variable equal to one for acquisitions of firms in another two-digit SIC code than the 
acquirer; Competed deals is a dummy variable equal to one if the deal is classified as competed by SDC; Days to completion 
is the difference between effective and announcement date; Liquidity index is calculated as the value of all transactions for $1 
million or more reported by SDC for each year and two-digit SIC code divided by the total book value of assets of all 
Compustat firms in the same two-digit SIC code and year; Cash (Equity) in Payment is a dummy variable equal to one if part 
of consideration offered is cash (common stock); Pure cash (equity) deals is a dummy  variable equal to one  if the 
consideration offered consists only of cash (common stock); Hostile deals is a dummy variable equal to one if the attitude of 
the deal is classified as hostile by SDC; Tender offer is a dummy variable equal to one if the acquisition is a tender offer; 
Public target, private target, or subsidiary target is a dummy variable equal to one if the target is a public firm, a private firm, 
or subsidiary; Assets (market) is total assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity (Item #6- Item 60+ Item 
#25+Item #199); Debt is the sum of short-term and long-term debt (Item #9 + Item #34); Tobin`s Q is assets (market) divided 
by assets (book) ((Item #6- Item 60+ Item #25+Item #199)/Item #6); finally OCF is sales less cost of goods sold, selling, 
general, and administrative costs and changes in working capital (Item #12 –Item #41 –Item #189 –Item #180). Acquirer that 
have a Moody`s estimated senior unsecured rating outstanding at announcement date of the transaction are classified as rated. 
P-values are reported below each coefficient. Results are obtained using robust standard errors. 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  (OLS)  (Panel)  (IV)  (OLS) 
Intercept  0.0227
c  0.0218
a  0.0186  0.090 
  0.076  0.000  0.141  0.527 
         
Private target  -0.007
a  -0.0003  -0.0087
a  -0.0025 
  0.006  0.906  0.002  0.388 
         
Public target  -0.0346
a  -0.0356
a  -0.0356
a  -0.0240
a 
  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
         
Rated  -0.0097
a  -0.0082
c  -0.0315
a   
  0.000  0.057  0.000   
         
Aaa/Aa        -0.0110
c 
        0.064 
         
A        -0.0092
b 
        0.043 
         
Baa        -0.0082
c 
        0.076 
         
Ba        -0.0055 
        0.163 
         
Caa        -0.0004 
        0.978 
         
Small  0.0149
a  0.0158
a  0.0086
a  0.0030 
  0.000  0.000  0.009  0.457 
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Conglomerate deal  0.0005  -0.0028  0.0013  -0.0040 
  0.802  0.289  0.548  0.112 
         
Tender offer  0.0199
a  0.0211
a  0.0285
a  0.0038 
  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.462 
         
Hostile deal  -0.0043  -0.0006
c  -0.0077  0.0029 
  0.638  0.966  0.414  0.767 
         
Competed deal  -0.0524
c  -0.0291  -0.0640
c   
  0.087 
 
0.672  0.055   
         
Pure equity deals  0.0009  0.0010  0.0012  -0.0060 
  0.802  0.752  0.739  0.144 
         
Pure cash deals  -0.0031  0.000  -0.0026  0.0033 
  0.165  0.877  0.257  0.235 
         
Transaction value / equity value 
 
0.0015  0.0021
b  0.0014  0.0080
a 
  0.165  0.017  0.170  0.000 
         
Tobin`s Q  -0.0009
c  -0.0005  -0.0005  -0.0002 
  0.051  0.301  0.103  0.794 
         
Debt/assets (market)  0.0243
a  -0.0004  0.0444
a  0.0050 
  0.000  0.968  0.000  0.564 
         
Liquidity index  -0.0049  0.0092  -0.0136  -0.0031 
  0.816  0.735  0.546  0.919 
         
OCF/ assets (market)  -0.0718
a  -0.0533
a  -0.0699
a  -0.0013 
  0.000  0.003  0.000  0.964 
         
Year fixed effects  Yes    Yes  Yes 
         
Firm fixed effects    Yes     
         
N  11547  11373  11516  2746 
         
Adjusted-R
2  0.037  0.029  0.0352  0.0799 
aStatistical significance at the 1% level. 
bStatistical significance at the 5% level. 
cStatistical significance at the 10% level.   32 
Table 7 Post acquisition change in capital structure of acquirer 
The sample comprises of all domestic U.S. mergers and acquisitions between 1980 and 2004 listed on SDC where the 
publicly traded acquiring firm ends up with all the shares of a public, private, or subsidiary target. Further selection criteria 
are that the transaction is completed, the transaction value is greater than $1 million and at least 1% of acquirer`s market 
value, and that the transaction is completed in less than 1000 days. The table presents cross-sectional regression of the change 
in leverage of acquiring firms on deal control variables. The dependent variable in Model 1 (2) is absolute (relative) change 
in leverage. The absolute change in leverage is measured as the fiscal year end leverage in the year following the completion 
minus the fiscal year end leverage in the year prior to the announcement date of the transaction. The relative change in 
leverage is absolute change in leverage divided by the fiscal year end leverage in the year prior to the announcement date of 
the transaction Leverage is market-leverage measured as total debt over the sum of total debt, liquidation value of preferred 
stocks and the market value of common stock (Item #9- Item 34)/(Item #9+Item #34+ Item #10+Item #25* Item #199). 
Control variables are as described in Table 6. P-values are reported below each coefficient. Results are obtained using robust 
standard errors. 
  (1)  (2) 
Intercept  0.0692
a  25.762
b 
  0.000  0.018 
     
Private target  -0.0059
c  -10.632 
  0.095  0.308 
     
Public target  -0.0056  -11.790 
  0.253  0.403 
     
Rated  -0.0215
a  -17.868
c 
  0.000  0.000 
     
Conglomerate deal  0.0003  0.3664 
  0.903  0.962 
     
Tender offer  0.0323
a  -0.2052 
  0.000  0.983 
     
Hostile deal  0.0334
c  0.1640 
  0.062  0.934 
     
Competed deal  0.0481  -16.869
b 
  0.360  0.011 
     
Pure equity deal  -0.0475
a  13.204 
  0.000  0.449 
     
Pure cash deal  -0.0073
b  -5.696 
  0.033  0.332 
     
Relative size  0.0012  -1.945
c 
  0.036  0.079 
     
Liquidity index  0.1063
a  37.882 
  0.002  0.505 
     
N  10964  9684 
Adjusted-R
2  0.0221  0.0135 
aStatistical significance at the 1% level. 
bStatistical significance at the 5% level. 
cStatistical significance at the 10% level.   33 
 
Table 8 Calendar-time post announcement performance sorted by acquirer rating status 
The sample comprises of all domestic U.S. mergers and acquisitions between 1980 and 2004 listed on SDC where the 
publicly traded acquiring firm ends up with all the shares of a public, private, or subsidiary target. Further selection criteria 
are that the transaction is completed, the transaction value is greater than $1 million and at least 1% of acquirer`s market 
value, and that the transaction is completed in less than 1000 days. The table presents the intercept of a calendar-time 
portfolio regression, which measures the abnormal performance (in percentage). The dependent variable is the excess return 
of an equally-weighted portfolio over the 1-month Treasury-bill rate. The portfolio contains all sample firms that have 
completed the event within the previous 6, 12, 18, 24, or 36 months, respectively. The portfolio is rebalanced every month to 
drop the firms that have reached the end of their holding periods and add all firms that have just completed a transaction. 
Repeated observations are dropped for each observation. Also months with less than 10 observations are dropped. The 
independent variables are the 4 Fama-French factors. Acquirer that have a Moody`s estimated senior unsecured rating 
outstanding at announcement date of the transaction are classified as rated. p-values are reported below each coefficient. 
 
  All  Rated   Not rated 
Holding period  (1)  (2)  (3) 
6-month  0.0005  0.0004  0.0013 
  0.717  0.802  0.447 
       
12-month  0.0009  -0.0014  0.0017 
  0.463  0.306  0.243 
       
18-month  0.0007  -0.0017  0.0015 
  0.495  0.141  0.267 
       
24-month  0.0008  -0.0006  0.0012 
  0.419  0.589  0.326 
       
36-month  0.0014  -0.0006  0.0018 
  0.157  0.537  0.114 
       
aStatistical significance at the 1% level. 
bStatistical significance at the 5% level. 
cStatistical significance at the 10% level.   34 
Table 9 Synergy gains sorted by acquirer rating status 
The sample comprises of all domestic U.S. mergers and acquisitions between 1980 and 2004 listed on SDC where the 
publicly traded acquiring firm ends up with all the shares of a public, private, or subsidiary target. Further selection criteria 
are that the transaction is completed, the transaction value is greater than $1 million and at least 1% of acquirer`s market 
value, and that the transaction is completed in less than 1000 days. The table reports mean synergy gains to the combined 
firm as calculated by the method of Bradley et al (1988). The total percentage synergy gains, CARC, is calculated as follows. 
We first form an event time value-weighted portfolios of the return of the target and acquirer for each transaction, where the 
weights are given by the market value of equity 2 days before the announcement of the deal. Than market model residuals are 
calculated for each transaction in the time period (-1, +1), where the estimation window spans the time period from (-205, 
+6). The CARC is calculated as the sum of the market model residuals in the event window (-1, +1). The $CARC is 
calculated as the sum of the market value of equity for the target and the acquirer times the CARC for the respective 
transaction. CARC is in percent, $CARC is in millions of dollar. p-values are reported below each coefficient. The difference 
tests are based on t-test for equality in means 
 
  All  Rated  Not-rated  Difference 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (3)-(2) 
CARC  2.139
a  1.983
a  2.245
a  0.262 
  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.536 
         
$CARC  -41.750
c  -62.764  -44.221  -18.543 
  0.067  0.255  0.129  0.709 
         
N  1729  702  1027   
aStatistical significance at the 1% level. 
bStatistical significance at the 5% level. 
cStatistical significance at the 10% level.   35 
Table 10 Cross-sectional regression analysis of announcement abnormal returns sorted 
by acquirers q 
The sample comprises of all domestic U.S. mergers and acquisitions between 1980 and 2004 listed on SDC where the 
publicly traded acquiring firm ends up with all the shares of a public, private, or subsidiary target. Further selection criteria 
are that the transaction is completed, the transaction value is greater than $1 million and at least 1% of acquirer`s market 
value, and that the transaction is completed in less than 1000 days. The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return 
of the acquirer over a 3 day period surrounding the announcement date. Model 1 (2) reports the results for acquirer in the 
lowest (highest) 33% Tobin`s Q quantiles. The explanatory variables are defined as follows. Transaction value is value of 
transaction ($mil) as reported by SDC, the small dummy is equal to 1 if the acquirer has a market capitalization 
equal to or less than the market capitalization of the 25th percentile of NYSE firms in the same year,; 
Conglomerate is a dummy variable equal to one for acquisitions of firms in another two-digit SIC code than the acquirer; 
Competed deals is a dummy variable equal to one if the deal is classified as competed by SDC; Days to completion is the 
difference between effective and announcement date; Liquidity index is calculated as the value of all transactions for $1 
million or more reported by SDC for each year and two-digit SIC code divided by the total book value of assets of all 
Compustat firms in the same two-digit SIC code and year; Cash (Equity) in Payment is a dummy variable equal to one if part 
of consideration offered is cash  (common stock); Pure cash (equity) deals is a dummy  variable equal to one if the 
consideration offered consists only of cash (common stock); Hostile deals is a dummy variable equal to one if the attitude of 
the deal is classified as hostile by SDC; Tender offer is a dummy variable equal to one if the acquisition is a tender offer; 
Public target, private target, or subsidiary target is a dummy variable equal to one if the target is a public firm, a private firm, 
or subsidiary; Assets (market) is total assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity (Item #6- Item 60+ Item 
#25+Item #199); Debt is the sum of short-term and long-term debt (Item #9 + Item #34); Tobin`s Q is assets (market) divided 
by assets (book) ((Item #6- Item 60+ Item #25+Item #199)/Item #6); finally OCF is sales less cost of goods sold, selling, 
general, and administrative costs and changes in working capital (Item #12 –Item #41 –Item #189 –Item #180). Acquirer that 
have a Moody`s estimated senior unsecured rating outstanding at announcement date of the transaction are classified as rated. 
P-values are reported below each coefficient. Results are obtained using robust standard errors. 
 
  (1)  (2) 
Intercept  -0.0142
c  0.0630
b 
  0.099  0.011 
     
Private target  -0.0108
c  -0.0015 
  0.055  0.722 
     
Public target  -0.0540
a  -0.0174
b 
  0.000  0.016 
     
Rated  -0.0136
a  -0.0074
b 
  0.006  0.033 
     
Small  -0.0000  0.0211
a 
  0.988  0.000 
     
Conglomerate deal  0.0079
c  -0.0021 
  0.081  0.587 
     
Tender offer  0.0414
a  -0.0005 
  0.000  0.945 
     
Hostile deal  -0.0393  0.0157 
  0.241  0.171 
     
Competed deal    -0.0474 
    0.219 
     
Pure equity deals  -0.0062  -0.0093 
  0.234  0.334   36 
     
Pure cash deals  -0.0068  -0.0049 
  0.124  0.168 
     
Transaction value / 
    
0.0152  0.0010 
  0.375  0.178 
     
Tobin`s Q  -0.0000  -0.0399
b 
  0.974  0.01 
     
Debt/assets (market)  0.0626
a  -0.0015 
  0.008  0.902 
     
Liquidity index  0.0167  -0.0126 
  0.681  0.716 
     
OCF/ assets (market)  -0.0612  -0.0614 
  0.130  0.000 
     
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes 
     
N  3927  3810 
     
Adjusted-R
2  0.0451  0.053 
aStatistical significance at the 1% level. 
bStatistical significance at the 5% level. 
cStatistical significance at the 10% level.   37 
Table 11 Information leakage sorted by sorted by acquirer rating status 
The sample comprises of all domestic U.S. mergers and acquisitions between 1980 and 2004 listed on SDC where the 
publicly traded acquiring firm ends up with all the shares of a public, private, or subsidiary target. Further selection criteria 
are that the transaction is completed, the transaction value is greater than $1 million and at least 1% of acquirer`s market 
value, and that the transaction is completed in less than 1000 days. Acquirer that have a Moody`s estimated senior unsecured 
rating outstanding at announcement date of the transaction are classified as rated. CAR denotes the cumulative abnormal 
return over a 22-day event window (-25,-3) around the announcement date. It is the calculated as the realized stock return 
minus the return of the market portfolio, where the market portfolio is given by the equal-weighted portfolio from CRSP. The 
first (second) row reports the mean (median). The final row lists the number of observations for each sub-group. Mean and 
median values are tested using two-sided t-tests and Wilcoxon T tests, respectively. The difference tests are based on t-test 
for equality in means and Wilcoxon sign-rank test for equality of medians.  
 
  All  Rated  Not rated  Difference 
CAR  (1)  (2)  (3)  (3)-(2) 
  .901
a  0.361
c  1.070
a  0.709 
  [0.230]
a  [0.220]  [0.250]
a  [0.030] 
  n=11547  n=2746  n=8801   
a Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
b Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
c Statistical significance at the 10% level.   38 
Table 12 Determinants of bidder premium and the probability of success 
The sample comprises of all domestic U.S. mergers and acquisitions between 1980 and 2004 listed on SDC where the 
publicly traded acquiring firm gains control of a public target or attempts to gain acquirer a public target. Further selection 
criteria are that the transaction value is greater than $1 million and at least 1% of acquirer`s market value.. Model (1) presents 
cross-sectional regression of the premium, defined as the aggregate value of cash, stock, and other securities offered by the 
bidder to the target shareholder divided by the market value of equity of the target 50 days prior to the acquisition 
announcement. Only observations with premium value between 0 and 2 are used in the regression. In model (2) the 
dependent variable is equal to 1 if the takeover attempt is classified as completed by SDC and zero otherwise. The 
explanatory variables are defined as follows. Pure cash deals is a dummy variable equal to one if the consideration offered 
consists only of cash; Toehold is a dummy variable equal to one if the acquirer owns at least 5 percent of the target shares 
and zero otherwise; rated is a dummy variable equal to one if the acquirer has a Moody`s estimated senior unsecured rating 
outstanding at announcement date of the transaction; Equity value (market) is number of common shares outstanding times 
price (Item #25 *Item 199); Tender offer is a variable equal to one if the acquisition is a tender offer; Hostile deals is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the attitude of the deal is classified as hostile by SDC; Conglomerate is a dummy variable 
equal to one for acquisitions of firms in another two-digit SIC code than the acquirer; Tobin`s Q is assets (market) divided by 
assets (book)  ((Item #6- Item 60+ Item #25+Item #199)/Item #6); finally Competed deals is a variable equal to one if the 
deal is classified as competed by SDC.P-values are reported below each coefficient. Results are obtained using robust 
standard errors. 
  (1)  (2) 
  Pr(success)  Premium 
Intercept  0.3370 
0.646 
1.9011
a 
0.000 
     
Premium  0.470
a   
  0.000   
     
Pure cash deals  -1.541
a 
0.000 
-0.1910
a 
0.027 
     
Toehold  0.1936 
0.321 
-0.1196
a 
0.006 
     
Rated  0.2357
b 
0.034 
-0.0279
 
0.205 
     
ln(Equity Market) target  -0.5520
a 
0.000 
-0.2754
a 
0.000 
     
ln(Equity Market) acquirer  0.5459
a  0.0958
a 
  0.000  0.000 
     
Tender offer  1.3434
a 
0.000 
0.1564
a 
0.000 
     
Hostile deal  -2.0184
a 
0.000 
0.0813
c 
0.071 
     
Conglomerate  -0.0789 
0.433 
0.0310 
0.121 
     
Tobins Q target  0.0359 
0.230 
-0.0198
a 
0.0003 
     
Tobins Q acquirer  0.00471 
0.809 
-0.0000 
0.984 
     
Competed  -2.0305
c 
0.099 
0.3457
c 
0.086 
     
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes
 
 
N  3510  3510 
     
R
2  0.233  0.305 
aStatistical significance at the 1% level. 
bStatistical significance at the 5% level. 
cStatistical significance at the 10% level.   39 
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Table A1. First stage of instrument variable regression 
The sample comprises of all domestic U.S. mergers and acquisitions between 1980 and 2004 listed on SDC where the 
publicly traded acquiring firm ends up with all the shares of a public, private, or subsidiary target. Further selection criteria 
are that the transaction is completed, the transaction value is greater than $1 million and at least 1% of acquirer`s market 
value, and that the transaction is completed in less than 1000 days. The dependent variable is equal to one if the acquirer has 
a Moody`s estimated senior unsecured rating outstanding at announcement date of the transaction. The instruments are 
defined as follows. Firm trades on the NYSE is a variable equal to one is the shares trades on the NYSE; Firm is in the S&P 
500 is a variable equal to one if the firm is member of the S&P 500; Percent rated industry is log of one plus the percentage 
of firms in the same three-digit  SIC industry that have a bond rating in Compustat; Percent rated industry (weighted) is log 
of one plus the percentage of firms in the same three-digit  SIC industry that have a bond rating in Compustat weighted by 
the market value of assets; finally Firm is young is a variable equal to one if the firm`s age is less than or equal to three years. 
All other instruments are defined as in Table 6. P-values are reported below each coefficient. 
 
  (1) 
Intercept  -0.0183 
  0.662 
   
Firm trades on the NYSE  0.1378
a 
  0.000 
   
Firm is in S&P 500  0.2669
a 
  0.000 
   
Percent rated industry  0.6392
a 
  0.000 
   
Percent rated industry (weighted)  -0.1261
a 
  0.000 
   
Firm is young  0.0079 
  0.319 
   
Private target  -0.0334
a 
  0.000 
   
Public target  0.0261
b 
  0.018 
   
Small  -0.1755
a 
  0.000 
   
Conglomerate deal  -0.0167
b 
  0.010 
   
Tender offer  -0.0157 
  0.367 
   
Hostile deal  0.0802
b 
  0.067 
   
Competed deal  -0.3092 
  0.367 
       43 
Pure equity deals  0.0022 
  0.804 
   
Pure cash deals  0.0058 
  0.449 
   
Transaction value / equity value (market)  -0.0012 
  0.132 
   
Tobin`s Q  -0.0001 
  0.850 
   
Debt/assets (market)  0.5565
a 
  0.000 
   
Liquidity index  0.0207 
  0.795 
   
OCF/ assets (market)  -0.0177 
  0.553 
   
Year fixed effects  Yes 
   
N  11516 
   
Adjusted-R
2  0.359 
   
F-value (βinstruments=0)  170.75 
aStatistical significance at the 1% level. 
bStatistical significance at the 5% level. 
cStatistical significance at the 10% level. 
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